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Probable Cause for Tax Seizure Warrants
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Under the liberal self-reporting framework of our federal tax
system, the Secretary of the Treasury enjoys broad summary collection powers.1 The most potent weapon in this statutory arsenal
is 26 U.S.C. § 6331, providing that a taxpayer with assessed but
unpaid tax liabilities is subject to levy upon all of his property.
Additionally, the Internal Revenue Service may seize this property
"by any means."2 The Supreme Court has endorsed the constitutionality of these summary seizures since 1856,3 and has declared
that administrative proceedings for collection of revenue satisfy
due process, reasoning that prompt, post-seizure judicial review is
available to taxpayers.4
While ruling that the seizures themselves were constitutional,
the Court had not addressed the legality of searches of private
property accompanying tax seizures until G.M. Leasing Corp. v.
t A.B. 1982, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1988, The University of Chicago.

' The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary to determine and assess all unpaid income taxes. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6201-04 (1982)(all references to the United States Code are
to Title 26 unless otherwise indicated). Under § 6303, the Secretary must send notice of an
assessment and make a demand for payment to the taxpayer within 60 days of the assessment. Section 6321 provides that if any taxpayer liable for taxes neglects or refuses to pay
after demand, the amount due shall support a lien in favor of the United States upon all of
the taxpayer's real and personal property.
I Section 6331 authorizes the Secretary to levy upon all of the taxpayer's property if
the taxpayer does not pay within 10 days of notice and demand. A "levy" is "[t]he obtaining
of money by legal process through seizure and sale of property." Black's Law Dictionary
(5th ed. 1979). As clarified in § 6331(b), "the term 'levy' as used. . . includes the power of
distraint and seizure by any means." Sections 6331(a) and (d)(3) provide an exception from
the 10-day waiting period for cases in which the IRS believes that the collection of taxes is
in jeopardy. In these emergency situations, § 6861 permits the IRS to assess and collect the
tax immediately, subject to certain restrictions.
3 See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
" See Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 595-601 (1931).
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United States5 in 1977. The IRS previously had interpreted the
Internal Revenue Code as sanctioning administrative methods for
seizures pursuant to § 6331, without concern for the possible
fourth amendment implications of searches for liened property.' In
G.M. Leasing the Supreme Court imposed a warrant requirement
on non-exigent tax seizures that involve the entry into and search
of private premises. The Court failed, however, to give concrete
guidance concerning the standards for issuing such a warrant.
Lower courts uniformly have interpreted G.M. Leasing as imposing a probable cause requirement on tax seizure warrants,"
working from the explicit language of the fourth amendment.8
Courts have taken two approaches, though, with regard to the appropriate standard of probable cause for these warrants. Some federal courts have espoused use of the traditional probable cause
standard, which would require assessment of testimony presented
to a magistrate to determine whether it demonstrates a "fair
probability" that the assets sought are both legally seizable and
currently at the site to be searched."
Other courts, in contrast, have embraced a probable cause test
that focuses on the existence of administrative or legislative guidelines to curtail the discretion of government officers executing tax
seizure warrants. 10 This "administrative" warrant standard for
probable cause was first developed in Camara v. Municipal
Court,1 where the Supreme Court held that a warrant is required
for public safety inspections. The Court at the same time eased the

5 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
6 Prior to G.M. Leasing, the IRS "had for years pursued the administrative practice,
pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. § 7301(a), of seizing any property found in the possession, custody
or control of the person against whom the tax had been imposed." Matter of Carlson, 580
F.2d 1365, 1369 (10th Cir. 1978).
See United States v. Condo, 782 F.2d 1502, 1504-05 (9th Cir. 1986); Matter of Campbell, 761 F.2d 1181, 1186 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Shriver, 645 F.2d 221, 222 (4th
Cir. 1981); Carlson, 580 F.2d at 1376-82; Matter of Tax Indebtedness of Stephens, 54 Bankr.
626, 627 (D.Mont. 1985); Matter of Gerwig, 461 F.Supp. 449, 451 (C.D.Cal. 1978); Matter of
Brickner, 453 F.Supp. 91, 92 (E.D.Wisc. 1978).

' The fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
' See Condo, 782 F.2d at 1504-05; Stephens, 54 Bankr. at 627; Gerwig, 461 F.Supp. at

451; Brickner, 453 F.Supp. at 93.
10 See Campbell, 761 F.2d at 1186; Shriver, 645 F.2d at 222-23; Carlson, 580 F.2d at
1381; Matter of Brown, 55 Am.Fed.Tax Rptr.2d 85-462, 85-463 (C.D.Utah 1984); Bormann

v. Tomlin, 461 F.Supp. 193, 196-98 (S.D.Ill. 1978).
1 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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probable cause standard for those inspections. Here, the Court
found probable cause satisfied by reasonable administrative or legislative regulations that restrict the state's discretion in making
inspections.
Part I of this comment discusses the G.M. Leasing decision
and outlines the rules it established for tax seizures. Part II
sketches the contours of the two probable cause standards currently in use: that applied to traditional searches and that used in
administrative inspections. The section also illustrates the traditional and administrative probable cause standards in the tax warrant context. Part III analyzes the lower courts' interpretations of
G.M. Leasing, setting out their divergent approaches to the probable cause question. Part IV compares tax seizures to both criminal
searches and administrative searches and concludes by demonstrating the need for the traditional standard of probable cause in
§ 6331 cases.
I. G.M. Leasing v. United States
The Supreme Court first examined the constitutionality of
warrantless IRS searches pursuant to § 6331 in G.M. Leasing v.
United States.12 The case involved a jeopardy assessment against a
delinquent taxpayer, George Norman, Jr., and his alter ego, G.M.
Leasing Corporation. In satisfaction of outstanding levies, the IRS
seized several luxury cars belonging to G.M. Leasing that were located in public areas. Some days later, IRS officers seized and proceeded to search a cottage that G.M. Leasing used as its business
offices.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question
whether the fourth amendment barred the warrantless searches
and seizures of the automobiles and the cottage. The Court found
there was probable cause that G.M. Leasing's assets were seizable.
Moreover, the company did not allege the absence of probable
cause that it owned the automobiles or that its offices would contain other seizable property. "[T]he only questions before the
Court [were] whether warrants were required to make 'reasonable'
either the seizures of the cars or the entry into and seizure of goods
in the cottage."13
The Court found the automobile seizures constitutional on the
ground that they occurred on public premises and consequently
22

13

429 U.S. 338 (1977).
Id. at 351.
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did not involve an invasion of privacy. The Court cited Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.' to justify warrantless seizures under the tax laws, and as that case similarly involved
a "public" seizure,' 5 G.M. Leasing held that both cases were "governed by the same principles."'" This aspect of the decision can
best be read as a statement that under prevailing fourth amendment doctrine, taxpayers do not enjoy a legitimate expectation of
privacy with regard to seizable property located in "public"
7
areas.'
By contrast, the Court found that the cottage had greater
fourth amendment protection, and held that the IRS's entry into it
invaded Norman's privacy. The Court declared that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."' 8 The Court rejected the IRS's assertion that case law provided an exception to the general warrant
requirement for tax collection, and held that in the absence of
"clear evidence" of such a loophole, warrantless tax searches were
unjustified.' 9 The Court also rejected the IRS's argument that the
statute attempted to create a statutory exemption to the warrant
requirement for tax seizures.2 0
While the decision clearly established that § 6331 searches
must be under warrant, G.M. Leasing shed no light on the probable cause guidelines which magistrates should use in issuing the
"

59 U.S. 272 (1856).

" The seizure in Murray's Lessee was a transfer of title to property.
16 429 U.S. at 351-52.

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11 G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 352-53, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
17

528-29 (1967). The Court also refused to extend the "pervasively regulated business" exception to tax enforcement. G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 353-54. As the Court has explained this
exemption, "[t]here are certain 'relatively unique circumstances'. . .in which consent to regulatory restrictions is presumptively concurrent with participation in the regulated enterprise." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979), quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 313 (1978). The Court has identified three major industries as "pervasively regulated." See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor industry); and Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594 (1981) (underground and surface mines).
19 G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 355.
'0 The Court read § 6331(b), which allows "distraint and seizure by any means," to
authorize "the use of every means to deprive the taxpayer of use, enjoyment, or title to
property." The Court held that such language nonetheless "does not refer to warrantless
intrusions into privacy." G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 356-57. The Court refused to interpret
the statute more broadly, as the IRS urged, declaring that "[t]he respondents offer no legislative history in support of their reading of § 6331, and to give the statute that reading
would call its constitutionality into serious question." Id. at 358.
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warrants, as the taxpayer in the case did not contest the probable
cause issue.21. Confusion among lower courts quickly arose in light
of the Supreme Court's landmark search warrant decisions in
Camara v. Municipal Court2 2 and See v. City of Seattle.23 These
cases set forth two different standards for probable cause analysis,
amd lower courts have split over which standard is appropriate for
tax seizures.

II. PROBABLE CAUSE
A.

The Traditional Standard

Surprisingly few enunciations have been made in the case law
of the precise dimensions of "probable cause" for search warrants.2 4 The problem has two elements: first, one must answer the
question "probable cause to determine what?" and, second, one
must determine the satisfactory level of proof.
The solution to the first inquiry can be summarized as follows:
when appearing before a magistrate, "the state must show probable cause to believe that: (1) a crime has been committed, and (2) a
specific object of the state's interest exists (evidence, a suspect, or
a material witness) and (3) the intrusion will secure the object." 5
The latter two considerations reflect a concern that the object or
person sought will be found at the site to be searched.26 To ensure
21 Id. at 351.
22 387 U.S. 523
23

(1967).
387 U.S. 541 (1967).

24 "The amount of probability necessary to satisfy probable cause has resisted quantification." Comment, The Theory of Probable Cause and Searches of Innocent Persons: The
Fourth Amendment and Stanford Daily, 25 UCLA L.Rev. 1445, 1448 n.9 (1978). A number
of decisions have simply projected the baseline notion of probable cause used for arrest
warrants onto the search context, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162. See
also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
25 Comment, 25 UCLA L.Rev. at 1454 (cited in note 24) (footnote and emphasis
omitted).
26 See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981)("A search warrant. . .is issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is
located in a particular place."); Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:
Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 664, 687 (1961).
It is interesting to note that this emphasis on the probability of success of the search in
effect sets the countervailing public and private interests in the search on an equal footing.
One commentator has proposed a variation on Judge Hand's formula in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), to illustrate this calculation. According
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that the object or person will be there, the magistrate must look
for signs of staleness of prior police research. As one court has
noted,
delay in seeking and obtaining a search warrant may invalidate it.. . . Obviously, a highly incriminating or consumable

item of personal property is less likely to remain in one place
as long as an item of property which is not consumable.

not particularly incriminating.

7

. .

or

While the elements which must be shown to be supported by
probable cause are well-established, the quantum of proof that the
government must provide is less evident. Rather than drawing a
"more probable than not" bright line, courts and commentators
have preferred to blur the test.2 s In addressing the issue, Judge
Learned Hand proposed that "[n]o more is required than a fair
presumption."29 Professor LaFave has claimed that
[t]he requirement of probable cause does not mean that there
must be "a showing of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"; what
is needed is "reasonable grounds for suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man in the belief."30
to this author,
the concept of probable cause is best characterized as an evidentiary standard that
embodies a balance among three variables, probability, cost, and value. This balance
may be formulated as VP > C, where V represents the value of the search to society,
P, the probability of success, and C, the cost of the intrusion into privacy.. . . [In
criminal cases] the cost (C) and value (V) variables are held constant.
Note, Camara,See, and Their Progeny- Another Look at Administrative Inspections Under
the Fourth Amendment, 15 Colum.J.L. & Soc.Prob. 61, 79-80 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
Consequently, the seriousness of the crime which engenders the search is irrelevant and
the level of intrusiveness of the search is generally ignored. The only "weighing" or "balancing" which normally occurs in a criminal probable cause assessment is to determine the
odds that the person, property or evidence sought will actually be found. There are, of
course, some extremely intrusive searches in which the Court has amended its policy of
disregarding the degree of invasion which a particular search would impose on the individual. See, for example, Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1985) (surgery to remove a
bullet from defendant's abdomen as evidence of commission of a shooting held an "unreasonable search").
17 United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1975).
" "The Supreme Court

. .

. has refrained from expressing the required level of cer-

tainty in mathematical terms, relying instead on a scale of less exact but more familiar legal
terminology." Ronald J. Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of
Probable Cause, 1979 U.ll.L.Forum 763, 771.
29 United States v. Old Dominion Warehouse, Inc., 10 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1926).
30 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law... Has Not...
Run Smooth", 1966 U.Dl.L.Forum 255, 259, citing People v. York, 29 fll.2d 68, 193 N.E.2d
773 (1963) and People v. Lavendowski, 329 IMI.223, 160 N.E. 582 (1928).
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A number of other analysts have equated probable cause with a
"substantial probability" test."
B. The Camara Standard For Administrative Searches
2 and See v.
The Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco"
City of Seattle3 3 cases, decided on the same day in 1967, imposed a
warrant requirement on administrative searches under municipal
housing and fire codes. Roland Camara refused to permit a San
Francisco housing official to make a routine annual inspection of

31See People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 259, 282 N.E.2d 614, 617 (1972); Comment, 28

U.Chi.L.Rev. at 687 (cited in note 26); Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H.
Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 280 (6th ed. 1986).
In attempting to apply this theoretical level of proof in a meaningful manner, cases
which rest probable cause on an informant's tip provide a helpful analogy. Although the
framework used in the tip cases may not fit perfectly when the supporting affidavit in a tax
seizure case is based solely on IRS agents' investigation, there are two reasons why the approach is fruitful. First, at least some of the § 6331 warrants issued will rely on information
derived from non-IRS sources. Second, while in most instances government officials can be
presumed to act in good faith, those few occasions when their activities are malicious justify
at least a cursory magisterial review of the veracity of affidavits. See Fulton Market Cold
Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978) (allegations of intentional overassessment of taxes by county assessor); North American Cold Storage Co. v. County of Cook, 468
F.Supp. 424 (N.D. IlM.1979) (same).
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), represents the prevailing interpretation of the
standard under which magistrates should determine the existence of probable cause in the
informant context. The Gates Court explicitly rejected the two-pronged analysis stemming
from Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969). Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, a magistrate first looked to the credibility of the
witness or affiant as evidenced by past honest tips. Second, the magistrate evaluated the
basis of the informant's knowledge in order to determine the likely accuracy of the witness'
information on the particular occasion. Gates, 462 U.S. at 229 n.4. Proponents saw the two
separate inquiries as providing assurance both that the informant was, in general, not a liar
(and thus that his testimony should be given credence in this case), and that there was some
reason to believe that, in addition to the informant's history of honesty, he could demonstrate some objective support for trusting this particular story.
The Gates Court declared that "the 'two-pronged' test has encouraged an excessively
technical dissection of informants' tips." Id. at 234. The opinion then proposed a "totalityof-the circumstances" measure to replace the credibility and basis of knowledge inquiries.
Under this new standard,
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.
Id. at 238.
32 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
3 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See is important because it extended the warrant requirement to
searches of commercial structures. The Court's analysis in See, however, proceeds along the
line developed in Camara,and thus the rest of the discussion in this section will focus only
on Camara.
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his residence. After two further denials of official requests to enter
his building, Camara was charged with a criminal violation of § 507
of the San Francisco Municipal Code for refusing to allow authorized employees to inspect his premises. Noting that the fourth
amendment incorporates a presumption in favor of warrants, 4 the
Court expressly overruled Frank v. Maryland which, only eight
years earlier, had declared warrantless administrative searches
valid, stating that these searches touched "at most upon the periphery" of fourth amendment concerns.3 5 The Frank Court had
concentrated on the civil nature of regulatory inspections, effectively holding that only criminal searches enjoyed fourth amendment safeguards.
Camara turned its back on the Frank framework, claiming
that "[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."3 6 The
Court went on to discuss the potential for abuse of discretion in
warrantless field inspections and, in support of the need for warrants, said that "broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for
individualized review. '' 7 Finally, the Court dismissed the government's argument that a warrant requirement would frustrate the
public interest in administrative searches, holding that the burden
of obtaining prior judicial approval was not fatal to the societal
purposes underpinning the searches.3 8
The most critical aspect of Camara for the purposes of the tax
seizure cases is the Court's treatment of probable cause for the
" Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29.
35 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
31 Camara, 387 U.S. at 530. The warrant requirement established by Camara implemented the recommendations of critics of Frank. Justice Douglas, in his Frank dissent,
quoted Chief Judge Prettyman's opinion in District of Columbia v. Little, noting that "[t]he
basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not protection against self-incrimination; it was the common-law right of a man to privacy in his home." Frank, 359 U.S. at 377
(Douglas dissenting), quoting Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C.Cir. 1949), aff'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). Another commentator claimed that, under the Frank regime,
"[t]hose types of governmental invasions of privacy most likely to involve the law-abiding
person are subjected to the least restraint, those directed primarily against persons suspected of crime to the greatest." Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Personal Rights, Property Rights,
and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 S.Ct.Rev. 46, 71-72. It is not clear, however, that analysts
taking Barrett's view would be as enthusiastic about the Camara Court's loosening of the
probable cause standard. See, for example, Comment, State Health Inspections and "Unreasonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 Minn.L.Rev. 513, 532 (1960)
("[O]nly a very serious threat to community health... could justify compromise with the
principle that the need for each intrusion must be proved by the intruder.").
'T Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
Id at 532-33.
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newly imposed warrants. The Court began its probable cause discussion by noting that "[iln cases in which the Fourth Amendment
requires that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable cause' is
the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested
against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." 39
In some sense, it is a misnomer to label the administrative
standard "probable cause" at all, as it addresses the neutrality and
reasonableness of guidelines, rather than the likelihood of finding
evidence. One suspects that the Supreme Court and, in turn, the
lower courts,4 ° use the term in order to satisfy the command of the
fourth amendment that "no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause." Naturally, confusion has arisen from this distortion of the
commonly understood meaning of probable cause. The Court has
not eased this puzzlement, and in fact has aggravated it, through
pronouncements in other fourth amendment contexts. In South
Dakota v. Opperman, for example, the Court declared that
[t]he standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures....
The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions.... :1
Ignoring these problems in its refashioning of "probable cause,"
the Camara Court claimed that "there can be no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
2
search against the invasion which the search entails."'
In applying this standard to the housing inspections in
Camara, the Court cited three factors that combined to make the
area searches reasonable. First, "such programs have a long history
of judicial and public acceptance.' 4 Second, these inspections
were considered to be the only effective means of satisfying the
strong public interest in health and safety. Finally, the Court declared that because the housing code searches were "neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime,
they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's
privacy.44

39Id. at 534.
40 All of the lower courts which have faced the tax seizure problem, see note 7, have
discussed the warrant standard in terms of probable cause.
41 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976).
42 Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
43 Id. at 537.
" Id. It is ironic that this rationale is very similar to the explanation the Frank Court
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On the strength of these factors, the Camara Court stated that
it is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards.

. .

may be

based on the passage of time, the nature of the building...,
or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the
particular dwelling.45
Camara thus established a two-step analysis for ascertaining
whether an administrative standard of probable cause should apply. First, the "reasonableness" test specified by the Court must be
satisfied. Second, if "reasonableness" is established, the magistrate
must be confident that "reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection" exist to serve as a
buffer against governmental agents' discretion in undertaking
gave for refusing to require warrants for administrative inspections. See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. at 554 (Clark dissenting) (making a similar observation about the Frank majority).
For a prescient article written in the interim between Frank and Camara, see Comment, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment: A Rationale, 65
Colum.L.Rev. 288, 291-92 (1965) (footnotes omitted):
The basic flaw in the fourth amendment approach is that the established standard of
probable cause ... would have to be greatly diluted to accommodate the municipal
need ... for several periodic inspections.. . . Relaxation of the standard of probable
cause would be compelled by the need to avoid [the] consequences [of hampering these
inspections]. But once the standard were relaxed, the routine issuance of warrants
would compromise any effective protection against improper searches ....
[I]n an ex
parte proceeding... the existence of a spiteful motive is hardly likely to come to the
attention of the magistrate. . . . Moreover, whether the application is 'based on caprice' or on a 'plan of spot checks or area-by-area searches' would be extremely difficult

to determine.
A later critic succinctly stated that "[i]n the context of administrative searches, the
warrant requirement adds little or no protection of privacy beyond that already provided by
the fourth amendments reasonableness requirement." Note, Administrative Searches and
the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 Cornell L.Rev.
856, 861 (1979).
"I Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. The probable cause standard adopted in Camara echoed
Justice Douglas's Frank dissent and Justice Brennan's dissent from the result in Ohio ex
rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), which similarly upheld the constitutionality of warrantless administrative searches. As Justice Douglas wrote:
Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that would justify an
inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are clearly different from those that
would satisfy such an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken.
Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain facilities without a
further showing of cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection might of
itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant.
Frank, 359 U.S. at 383 (Douglas dissenting).
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health and safety searches.
In determining the precise contours of the reasonableness test,
one can look to the Camara Court's rationales of historical acceptance, high public need, and low privacy intrusiveness. The first asserted criterion seems clearly inadequate to repel a constitutional
challenge. As Professor LaFave has noted,
the continued operation of [periodic and area inspection] programs may show only a "history of acquiescence." [S]imilar or
even greater evidence of judicial and public acceptance of
long-used procedures has not deterred the Court from finding
those procedures constitutionally defective .... '
The strength of the second argument, that the public interest
in the enforcement of regulations justifies reducing the level of
probable cause, depends on how one measures "public need."
When one compares society's interest in building code enforcement
with its concern for the criminal law's effectiveness, it is difficult to
maintain that the public's desire to uphold building codes clearly
outweighs its desire to catch criminals.
LaFave points out an interesting offshoot from this reasoning,
however. He asserts that the public interest justification is more
compelling when a reduced probable cause standard is viewed as
the only practical means of facilitating, say, building code enforcement. Administrative violations often take place on private premises, removed from the public's and the inspector's surveillance.
Criminal activities, on the other hand, typically involve "aggressive
conduct, most often occurring in public places, which usually
leaves a trail of discernible facts. . . .Even in the case of so-called
victimless crimes, including those committed within private premises, the police are not without means of detection." LaFave notes
that victimless crimes "require customers, and thus the way is
open for the use of informants and undercover agents. ' 47 This reasoning suggests that the existence of alternative mechanisms for
ensuring compliance cuts against the need for using the administrative probable cause standard, and instead creates a presumption
in favor of the traditional test.
The third factor in the Camara analysis is the lower intrusiveness of regulatory inspections. Several commentators on the re46 Wayne R. LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The
Camara and See Cases, 1967 S.Ct.Rev. 1, 14, quoting Frank, 359 U.S. at 384 n.2 (Douglas
dissenting).
41Id. at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).
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duced probable cause standard have identified elements which
combine to make administrative searches less oppressive. These
characteristics include the absence of stigma created by inspections; the fact that regulatory searches are normally conducted
during the day by unarmed officials, rather than police; the shorter
duration of the sweeps; and the fact that generally nothing is
seized. 8
As generalizations, these factors do seem to differentiate administrative searches from their criminal counterparts. Yet they
cannot stand alone in defining "intrusiveness." An additional component of the search must be scrutinized in order to apply the appropriate probable cause gauge, a component variously labeled as
the "routine" nature of the search or the level of "hostility" involved in the inspection.49 The concern here is whether the search
is aimed at a suspected individual or is part of a neutral series of
similar inspections. If there is particularized suspicion, the low intrusiveness assumption of Camara dissolves, and the administrative standard should not be applied to the search involved.
In sum, then, the Camara "reasonableness" rationale boils
down to two considerations. The first is whether enforcement of an
administrative policy would be stymied by use of the traditional
search standard. The second is the generality, or conversely the
particularity, of the suspicion that prompts the search. 50
The subsequent Supreme Court cases applying the administrative probable cause standard have followed this framework imperfectly. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.5 1 the Court imposed a warrant requirement on searches pursuant to § 8(a) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.52 Officials of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) previously
had made warrantless inspections of employers' plants, but the
Court invalidated this procedure, citing Camara as precedent for
mandatory warrants. The Court noted that
probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be
4 See Note, 15 Colum.J.L. & Soc.Prob. at 82-83 (cited in note 26); LaFave, 1967
S.Ct.Rev. at 19. See Part IV for a more detailed discussion of these considerations in the tax
seizure warrant context.
40 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530; Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 Minn.L.Rev.
607, 641 (1974); Charles R. McManis and Barbara Mayes McManis, Structuring Administrative Inspections: Is There Any Warrant for a Search Warrant?, 26 Am.U.L.Rev. 942, 964
(1977).
11 See LaFave, 1967 S.Ct.Rev. at 20 (cited in note 46).
51 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
5229 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1982).
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based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation,
. . .[but also may exist where] a specific business has been

chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources .... 53
Barlow's thus failed to differentiate between those situations involving particularized suspicion, which would not satisfy Camara's
"reasonableness" test, and those falling into a routine inspection
framework, which might pass that test. Consequently, the decision
seriously erred in its interpretation of Camara'stheory of probable
cause.
Michigan v. Tyler5 4 and Michigan v. Clifford55 dealt more effectively with the threshold Camara question. In pronouncing a
formula for searches of fire-scorched premises, the Tyler Court
drew a three-tiered system of analysis. First, the Court declared
that "an entry to fight a fire requires no warrant. 5' The exigent
circumstances of the fire legitimate the fire fighters' entry. Second,
the Tyler majority addressed administrative searches to ascertain
the cause of a fire. In this context, the Court imposed a warrant
requirement, stating that officials must have a magistrate verify
the propriety of the governmental intrusion under the Camara
standard. 57 Finally, the Court held that if investigators aim "to
gather evidence for a possible prosecution [for arson], they may
obtain a warrant only upon a traditional showing of probable cause
applicable to searches for evidence of crime."58
This tripartite analysis highlights that the existence of particularized suspicion is a key factor in the Court's determination of
the probable cause standard required for a search. Where the individual is not confronted with governmental hostility and suspicion,
the Court uses the Camara exception. The presence of a particu11

Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 324, 320-21 (footnote omitted).
436 U.S. 499 (1978).
5 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511.
57

The magistrate's duty is to assure that the proposed search will be reasonable, a determination that requires inquiry into the need for the intrusion on the one hand, and the
threat of disruption to the occupant on the other. For routine building inspections, a
reasonable balance between these competing concerns is usually achieved by broad legislative or administrative guidelines. . . . In the context of investigatory fire searches,
which are not programmatic but are responsive to individual events, a more particularized inquiry may be necessary.
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 507.
58 Id. at 512.
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larized investigation, on the other hand, mandates the traditional
probable cause standard. 9
C. The Standards As Applied to Tax Warrants
Before analyzing the post-G.M. Leasing treatment of probable
cause in the tax seizure context, it is useful to outline how the administrative and traditional probable cause standards would operate in § 6331 cases. Under the Internal Revenue Code, there are
certain prerequisites to any seizure of a taxpayer's lienable assets.
First, the Commissioner is authorized to determine and assess all
unpaid income taxes.60 Under § 6303, a notice of this assessment
and a demand for payment must be transmitted to the delinquent
taxpayer within 60 days. If the taxpayer does not come forth with
the money within 10 days of notice and demand, the Commissioner
may levy upon all of the taxpayer's property and may sanction a
seizure. 1
In deciding whether probable cause exists under the administrative "probable cause" standard, Camara and later cases suggest
that a court should make a categorical, rather than a case-by-case,
assessment of whether three requirements are met. In the tax
seizure context, the court should ascertain first whether use of the
traditional probable cause standard would stymie tax enforcement.
Second, the magistrate should inquire whether this type of search
is characterized by an absence of particularized suspicion. If both
preliminary reasonableness requirements are met, then the court
should ask whether Congress, through § 6331 or other provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code, or the Secretary of the Treasury,
through regulations, has promulgated neutral guidelines for IRS
agents making tax seizures under a warrant.
If any prong of this test is not satisfied, use of an administrative standard would violate the principles set forth in Camara.
Further, even if tax seizure warrants properly could be treated
under the administrative rubric, the magistrate must in each case
ascertain whether the Commissioner has followed the steps outlined in §§ 6201-6331, the Code's assessment and collection
59 Official suspicion of a citizen is not nil in the administrative context either. In the
fire scenario, for instance, if investigators are unaware of the cause of a blaze, there normally
will be a small, but nonetheless positive, probability that arson was at work. The difference
between the administrative and criminal cases, and thus the distinction between the existence or absence of particularized suspicion, is one of degree.
60 See §§ 6201-04.
"1See § 6331.
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procedures.
If tax seizures fall under traditional probable cause analysis,
one court has proposed that warrant applications must
enable the judge to make an independent determination of
whether probable cause exists to believe that: (1) An assessment of tax has been made against the taxpayer; (2) Notice
and demand have been properly made; (3) The taxpayer has
neglected or refused to pay said assessment within ten days
after notice and demand; and (4) Property, subject to seizure,
presently exists at the premises sought to be searched and
that said property either belongs to the taxpayer or is property upon which a lien exists for the payment of the taxes. 2
The fourth factor obviously is the crux of probable cause analysis
under the traditional standard. The traditional probable cause
standard is met if, and only if, the magistrate discerns a "fair
probability" that seizable assets currently exist at the site to be
searched.
III.

LOWER COURT TREATMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

The lower court cases pertaining to the probable cause standard for tax seizure warrants have split fairly cleanly into two
camps, one following the Camara administrative test and the other
adhering to traditional search criteria. In general, the applications
of the standards have been impressionistic. Like the Supreme
Court in Barlow's, the courts first "place" tax seizures into either
the administrative or the criminal category, and then evaluate the
affidavit under the test that follows "logically" from this
placement.
In reviewing the courts' analyses it is useful to test whether
the administrative probable cause standard is applicable. If the tax
warrant cases satisfy the reasonableness and neutral guidelines requirements of Camara, use of the administrative measure will be
supportable. If, on the other hand, these requirements cannot be
met, the traditional probable cause standard appears constitutionally mandated.
A.

The "Reasonableness" Test

Several lower courts have espoused the administrative probable

82

Matter of Gerwig, 461 F.Supp. 449, 452 (C.D.Cal. 1978).
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cause standard' 3 for tax seizure warrants on the ground that the
use of the traditional standard would eviscerate tax code enforcement. At least one decision, Matter of Carlson, has asserted that
since G.M. Leasing, IRS agents were unlikely to pursue non-public
seizures without judicial backing, 4 and declared that "if such enforcement measures are unavailable, the end result would probably
lead to effective frustration of the mandates of the code relating to
tax payments. '6 5 This reasoning superficially appears to meet the
Camara requirement that statutory enforcement be frustrated by
use of the traditional probable cause standard.
The argument is flawed, however, because the court made no
attempt to analyze the avenues open to the IRS to identify seizable
property, and thereby successfully carry out § 6331 seizures within
the bounds of the traditional probable cause standard. The court
also failed to compare the relative difficulties of criminal code and
tax code enforcement, and did not explain why tax searches would
be blocked by the traditional probable cause measure where criminal investigations would not. 6 Despite the weakness of this argument, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Shriver subsequently
endorsed it, stating that "[t]he [tax warrant] proceeding should
not have been converted into an adversary one or prolonged over a
period of years while taxes presumptively due and owing remain
'3 Cases adopting the administrative probable cause standard are Matter of Campbell,
761 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Shriver, 645 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1981); Matter
of Brown, 55 Am.Fed.Tax Rptr.2d 85-462 (C.D.Utah 1984); Bormann v. Tomlin, 461
F.Supp. 193 (S.D.I. 1978); Matter of Carlson, 434 F.Supp. 554 (D.C.Colo. 1977), rev'd, 580
F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Presumably because to do so would be unconstitutional. Prior to Carlson, the IRS
had employed "writs of entry" as a mechanism for evading the warrant requirement. See
Harry D. Shapiro and Robert K. Briskin, Sup. Ct., in G.M. Leasing, Restricts IRS Property
Seizures Without Search Warrants, 46 J.Tax'n 218, 220-21 (1977). Carlson declared that the
court no longer elected to use "the IRS term 'entry order,' but, instead, the district court's
reference to the need for a 'warrant,'" 580 F.2d at 1377, effectively closing the possible
loophole that worried Shapiro and Briskin. Subsequent cases treat requests for entry as
warrants, regardless of the label attached to them. See, e.g., Gerwig, 461 F.Supp at 451.
65 Carlson, 580 F.2d at 1381.
46

Both the civil and criminal laws respond to urgent public needs, and it does not suffice
to say, as some have, that the level of public need differs because civil law enforcement
requires searches and seizures on a broad scale, necessitating a more relaxed standard.
The argument that the Amendment must be reinterpreted to accommodate enforcement techniques developed without thought to the Constitution permits legislators and
administrators to redefine reasonableness at will. . . . Law enforcement, in other
words, should work within bounds set by the Fourth Amendment, not vice versa.
Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 Yale L.J. 1127,
1138-39 & n. 61 (1984) (the final sentence of the quoted passage is from the footnote).
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uncollected. 67 The Shriver court inexplicably assumed that use of
the traditional standard of probable cause would transform the ex
parte warrant application process into an adversarial one.
Perhaps the unstated concern of the Shriver court was that
use of the traditional standard would delay seizure of assets by the
IRS, running the risk that tax evaders could secret portable possessions. This concern alone, however, would not overcome the flaw
in the courts' reasoning in this area. The Supreme Court has indicated that, absent exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment
requires the government in criminal cases to secure a private area
suspected to contain evidence and to obtain a warrant before
searching it, even if there is a fear that evidence is in jeopardy."e
Neither Carlson nor Shriver explain why the Court's apparent
preference for less-intrusive enforcement alternatives in the criminal context should not obtain in the tax context.
The cases adopting the administrative standard also have
failed to confront the second prong of Camara,which would ask in
this context whether § 6331 searches are of low intrusiveness or are
characterized by individualized suspicion. These courts have emphasized instead the origin of the levy and seizure process in the
Internal Revenue Code and the administrative enforcement of
seizures by the IRS Commissioner. The Tenth Circuit in Carlson,
for example, stated that the Internal Revenue Code provides that
delinquent taxes are to be collected by "administrative means."
The court then flatly declared that "[w]hat is not involved here, in
the 'probable cause' meaning is that degree of 'probable cause' required to support a criminal search warrant. . . ."" Carlson's acceptance of Congress's "administrative" categorization of tax en67

645 F.2d at 222.

18Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). See also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796
(1984) (upholding search subsequent to arrest where officers secured premises for 19 hours
while awaiting search warrant).
" 580 F.2d at 1368, 1377. The court discussed Camara and See, implicitly linking the
two decisions to G.M. Leasing by noting that in establishing the warrant requirement, the
Court had used a quotation from Camarathat, with narrow exceptions, "a search of private
property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant." G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States. 429 U.S. 338, 358 (1977), quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). Carlson saw this reference as aligning the cases, and claimed that "none of these opinions [Camara, See, or G.M. Leasing]
identify the specifics of 'probable cause' requirements in support of search warrants in furtherance of administrative processes authorized by statute." Carlson, 580 F.2d at 1377. Notably, the language cited by the Carlson court to draw its analogy between G.M. Leasing
and Camara involved explanation of the general preference for warrants under the fourth
amendment; it did not arise in the context of Camara'sdiscussion of probable cause standards. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29.
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forcement as determinative of the applicable probable cause
standard gives the legislature a power of definition that allows it to
bend the fourth amendment to suit its prerogatives. This view appears incorrect, as Congress's burden of justifying its laws on constitutional grounds should not vary depending on its characterization of its own actions.
The opinions following the traditional probable cause methodology, in contrast, have emphasized that tax searches raise fourth
amendment concerns that are much the same as those in criminal
investigations. Matter of Brickner exemplifies this viewpoint. The
case involved an IRS attempt to obtain a warrant to search the
home of the father of a delinquent taxpayer, Gerald Brickner, for
property owned by the younger Brickner which was subject to
seizure. The IRS argued that an administrative search standard
should apply to the entry order. The court spurned this line of
reasoning, claiming that "[t]he present case ... is quite unlike the
situation in Camara.. . . [T]his case involves the consideration of

probable cause allegations that pertain to a particular individual
70
rather than to a general area or a general plan.

B. Neutral Guidelines
Once courts advocating use of the Camarastandard have concluded that tax searches meet the reasonableness test, they neglect
to scrutinize § 6331 searches for the existence of neutral guidelines
that act to cabin IRS officials' discretion. The court in Bormann v.
Tomlin,7 1 for example, focused on the statutory basis of the seizure
procedure, rather than looking for specific administrative regulations governing that procedure. The court used the fact that revenue laws 72 and the housing code in Camara were both "statutes

which attempt to authorize warrantless searches or intrusions on
private property" to infer that the Camara standard was appropriate for the warrant in question.7 3 The decision made no mention of
the necessity for neutral guidelines restraining the tax collector.
Despite its reliance on the Camara standard, the Fourth Circuit in Shriver did not concern itself with the neutrality of the IRS
71 453 F.Supp. 91, 93 (E.D.Wisc. 1978).

461 F.Supp. 193 (S.D. Ill.
1978).
7' Bormann arose under Illinois Revenue Code provisions similar to those of the Internal Revenue Code.
73 461 F.Supp. at 196-98. "In Barlow's Inc., the Court reaffirmed Camara and See that
probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required for issuance of a warrant." Id. at
198.
71
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regulations. The court stated that in tax seizure warrant cases,
[j]udges are simply to determine whether the application and
supporting affidavit showed probable cause to enter, search
for, and levy upon personal property in aid of summary collection of assessed and unpaid taxes.. . . Since we detect no de-

ficiency in the application or the affidavit, the warrant should
7.
have issued. ....

The affidavit submitted in Shriver stated that taxes had been assessed against the taxpayers, that notification and demand had
been made, that no payment had been forwarded, and that on the
taxpayers' farm "there were trucks, farm equipment and excavating equipment belonging to the taxpayers." No more detailed verification of these assertions was offered. The decision approvingly
noted that "[t]he [IRS] agents act under administrative instructions designed to protect taxpayers from oppressively excessive
levies, but they must be left with a substantial amount of
discretion. .

..",5

By stressing the statutory and civil form of § 6331 at the expense of the substantive constraints imposed by the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Department regulations, the cases applying the administrative standard have departed from the emphasis
in Camara and Barlow's on meaningful protection of individuals'
privacy.7 6 These lower courts' views create a curious rubber stamp

function for the magistrate, whose only role becomes to affirm that
statutory technicalities have been satisfied, rather than to assure
the sanctity of fourth amendment privileges. Justice Clark, in dissent in Camara and See, forecast this very danger in the Court's
new probable cause formulation. Clark maintained that the administrative standard
would permit the issuance of paper warrants... with probable cause based on . .. standards as set out in municipal

codes, and with warrants issued by the rubber stamp of a willing magistrate.. . . These boxcar warrants will be identical as

to every dwelling in the area, save the street number itself. I
daresay they will be printed up in pads of a thousand or
more-with space for the street number to be inserted-and
74 645 F.2d at 222.
75 Id. at 222-23.

76 These cases' reliance on the "civil" or "administrative" nature of tax enforcement
searches also highlights that Frank's civil/criminal dichotomy for fourth amendment interpretation may not be as obsolete as Camara proclaimed. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
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issued by magistrates in broadcast fashion as a matter of
7
course.

7

If meeting the Revenue Code requirements were sufficient to validate a § 6331 search, then the need for a warrant would dissolve
entirely. A search violating collection procedures could be challenged as illegal simply on the ground that the IRS failed to follow
its own policies.
Several lower courts that have rejected the administrative
probable cause measure for tax warrants have highlighted this rubber stamp danger. As the Gerwig court noted,
the district court cannot, of course, allow IRS agents total, uncontrolled discretion, once validly inside the premises pursuant to a warrant, to rummage everywhere in search of seizable
items.. . . [W]hile clearly it would be too burdensome to re-

quire. .. that the IRS list specifically what they plan to seize
and be limited solely to that list, some restraint is necessary.
. . [T]he
[
court's warrant must contain within it certain limitations protecting the taxpayer's privacy from unnecessary intrusions beyond those needed to allow the IRS agents enough
discretion to seize. 8
United States v. Condo further elaborated this theme, stating that
[t]he IRS application must have sufficient specificity to enable
the judge to make an independent determination of whether
probable cause exists and to prevent the agents from having
uncontrolled discretion. .

.

. Gerwig properly stresses the

need for restraints similar to those imposed on police executing search warrants ... .
IV. A

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE

Two

STANDARDS FOR TAX

WARRANTS

A. The Importance of the Standard
The likely unavailability of an effective remedy for a fourth
amendment violation in tax seizure cases heightens the importance
of identifying and applying the correct probable cause standard
when the warrant is issued. The most visible fourth amendment
remedy, the exclusionary rule, may be worthless in the majority of
7 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 547-48, 554 (Clark dissenting).
78 461 F.Supp. at 452-53.
79

782 F.2d 1502, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986).
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§ 6331 cases. In most instances, seizure of the taxpayer's assets is
the final step in the IRS's recoupment scheme. As seizure is not a
means of procuring evidence for a subsequent trial, the exclusionary rule would not deter the IRS from fourth amendment
breaches.
Even in cases which are targeted for future prosecution, it is
unclear whether the Supreme Court would apply the exclusionary
rule. In United States v. Janis,8 0 the Court refused to exclude evidence that had been illegally seized by state police agents in an
action by the IRS to establish a tax deficiency against Janis. The
precise implications of Janis are elusive, as a major factor in the
decision was a belief that preventing the IRS's use of the evidence
would not deter the unlawful conduct of state police. While it is
therefore possible that the Court would apply the exclusionary rule
where the IRS was itself the offending governmental organ, the
likelihood of this occurring is unknown. The Janis Court specifically stated that "[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the
[exclusionary] rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state."'
Additionally, the taxpayer pursuing the exclusion remedy
82
would face a formidable burden of proof. United States v. Leon
makes clear that the Court will not exclude evidence obtained in a
search which was undertaken pursuant to an invalid warrant unless the government agents executing the inspection knew or
should have known that the warrant was inadequate.8 3 The taxpayer would face only a slightly less demanding burden of proof in
a Bivens" action against the individual IRS employees. As the
lower court on remand in Bivens noted, "it is a defense to allege
and prove [that the federal agent acted in] good faith and reasonable belief in the validity of the . . . search ...
"I"
A citizen whose property was seized erroneously could recover
his assets in a refund action, after showing that the property was
not subject to a lien. It is highly unlikely, however, that a taxpayer
would recover property seized with liens outstanding against it.
The strong public policy in favor of tax enforcement makes it improbable that a court would force the IRS to return what are, in
8 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
81 Id. at 447 (1976) (footnote omitted).
82

468 U.S. 897 (1984).

Id. at 922-25 (1984).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
" Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d
Cir. 1972).
83
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effect, government assets in order to remedy a fourth amendment
breach.
B. The Determination of a Standard
In order to assess the appropriate probable cause standard for
tax seizures, it is useful to review the purposes and justifications
underlying Camara'sredefinition of the term "probable cause." As
explained in Part II above, in determining whether the administrative probable cause standard should apply, the Camara "reasonableness" test concentrates on whether the traditional probable
cause measure would frustrate effective statutory enforcement and
whether the target of the search is routinely selected from the general population, or is identified as being a likely offender through a
special investigation.
Upon close scrutiny, tax seizures fail to meet the criteria set
out for using this reduced standard of probable cause. First, a variety of alternate methods of tax code enforcement exist, which
reduces the likelihood of frustration of code enforcement through
use of the traditional probable cause standard. IRS officials can
monitor ownership records such as automobile registration and
property rolls, and can use informants and surveillance of businesses and residences to ascertain the existence of the taxpayer's
property.
Moreover, on a theoretical level, the problems faced in tax
seizures and searches are distinguishable from those encountered
in administrative inspections. In tax seizures, the culprit has been
identified before probable cause must be proved, since the IRS initially must determine who is a delinquent taxpayer before undertaking investigation. Consequently, in order to satisfy the traditional probable cause standard for this group, the government
must complete only one task: gathering specific information on an
already-identified individual.
This limited undertaking contrasts with the two rigorous requirements that would face officials attempting to satisfy the traditional standard for, say, a housing code inspection. The agent in
the latter case first would have to find a method of accurately discerning "offenders" among the general public, and then would
have to amass inculpatory evidence against the individuals so
targeted. As Justice Stevens noted in his Barlow's dissent, the first
of these two requirements would virtually guarantee the rejection
of a warrant application:
The routine OSHA inspections are, by definition, not based
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on cause to believe there is a violation on the premises to be
inspected. Hence, if the inspections were measured against
the requirements of the Warrant Clause, they would be automatically and unequivocally unreasonable."s
Because both types of warrants require particularized suspicion,
tax seizure warrants pose the same problems for IRS officials as
criminal warrants pose for police in criminal investigations. Courts
have not found the burdens imposed by the traditional standard to
be intolerable for criminal law enforcement; neither should Internal Revenue Code enforcement be stymied by the stricter probable
cause inquiry.
Tax seizure searches also fail to satisfy the second Camara
reasonableness prong. These invasions cannot be expected to be
brief in duration or narrow in scope; because the IRS can lay claim
to virtually all of the taxpayer's property, these intrusions are
likely to be lengthy and wide-ranging. These considerations give
rise to a forceful pragmatic argument in favor of the traditional
probable cause measure in the tax context, namely, the difficulty of
drawing principled, substantive distinctions between non-routine
civil searches and criminal searches.87
86 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 326 (Stevens dissenting). Justice Stevens' pro-

posed solution to his dilemma is to evaluate administrative inspections solely under the
reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment. He argues that "[t]he Court's approach
disregards the plain language of the Warrant Clause" by distorting the definition of probable cause:
[T]he general warrant, not the warrantless search, was the immediate evil at which the
Fourth Amendment was directed .... Fidelity to the original understanding of the
Fourth Amendment leads to the conclusion that the Warrant Clause has no application
to routine, regulatory inspections of commercial premises. If such inspections are valid,
it is because they comport with the ultimate reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 327-28.
17 This view contrasts with that expressed in Comment, The Permissible Scope of
OSHA Complaint Inspections, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 203 (1982), where the author concludes that
the appropriate standard of probable cause in OSHA complaint inspections is that used in
the line of cases originating with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968):
Under the reasonable belief standard, a warrant should issue if the employee's allegations are credible and support a reasonable belief that the violation will be found in the
place alleged .... Although establishment of an intermediate level of probability for
complaint inspections further complicates administration of the warrant requirement,
such variation is the inevitable result of applying a reasonableness standard to the warrant clause in administrative warrant cases.
Comment, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 232-33 (footnotes omitted). In arriving at this standard for
probable cause, the Comment did not scrutinize the relative merits of the possible approaches. While conceding that "[i]n degree of intrusiveness, the complaint inspection resembles a criminal search," the author simply proclaimed that "[b]ecause the violations
sought in the complaint inspection are not criminal, however, a less stringent showing of
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The abdication of the stricter standard of probable cause in
tax searches, which are nearly as intrusive on individual privacy as
are searches for criminal evidence, could lead to a serious and undeserved expansion of the use of Camara warrants. The process of
balancing competing governmental and privacy interests tends to
undervalue individuals' privacy stakes. s8 As many of the administrative warrant proceedings are ex parte, magistrates rely on government officials to supplement their own assessment of citizens'
interests. This systemic bias should be ameliorated in the context
of intrusive civil searches, of which tax seizures on private premises are but one example, 9 by establishing the stronger presumpprobability than that required for criminal searches is appropriate." Id. at 231 (footnote
omitted). This assertion disregards the CamaraCourt's rejection of the Frank criminal-civil
dichotomy as being "anomalous." See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
88 "[T]he structure of the balancing test inclines courts to hear the needs of law enforcement more clearly than the claims of privacy: Frequent chances for error systematically
weaken privacy." Note, 93 Yale L.J. at 1143 (cited in note 66).
89 Searches with a high level of intrusiveness include Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) sweep searches of businesses to identify illegal aliens based on informants'
tips; OSHA employee complaint investigations, in which officials enter an employer's plant
looking for violations which have been reported by an employee; and the fire investigation
searches discussed in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), and Michigan v. Clifford, 464
U.S. 287 (1984).
On INS sweep searches, see Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211
(D.C.Cir. 1981), where the court, emphasizing the "civil" nature of INS sweeps, "reasoned
that since the detention and deportation of illegal aliens have long been regarded as civil in
nature and not analogous to criminal investigations, the Camarastandard applied automatically." Note, Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo:A Need for a Closer Look at Administrative Probable Cause, 17 New Eng.L.Rev. 1373, 1389 (1982), citing Blackie's House of
Beef, 659 F.2d at 1218. See also Kotler Industries v. I.N.S., 586 F.Supp. 72, 75 (N.D.Ill.
1984). But see Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F.Supp. 1011, 1020 (N.D.Ill. 1982):
[A]dministrative warrants may not be used by INS to justify the seizure of persons.
Assuming arguendo that Blackie's was correctly decided and that INS may utilize an
administrative warrant to enter and search a given commercial location, such a warrant
does not authorize the search or seizure of persons found on the premises.
For analyses of OSHA complaint warrants, see Comment, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 203 (cited in
note 87); Note, Administrative Agency Searches since Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.: Probable
Cause Requirements for Nonroutine Administrative Searches, 70 Geo.L.J. 1183 (1982). The
latter Note concurs with the conclusions reached in this Comment. See id. at 1199.
Lower court cases in these areas which have applied the Camarastandard have been as
confounding as those which have done so in the tax context. Following Barlow's, the majority of lower courts which have grappled with OSHA inspections stemming from employee
complaints have refused to use the traditional probable cause standard. For example, the
court in Matter of Establishment Inspection, Etc., 589 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1979), applied the
administrative standard to an OSHA search of the employer's factory following an employee
tip. The court noted the statement in Barlow's that the Secretary's "entitlement to inspect
will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions in violation
of OSHA exist on the premises. Probable cause in the criminalsense is not required." Id. at
1388, quoting Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 320 (emphasis in Establishment Inspection). The Establishment Inspection court then noted that
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tion in favor of the citizen that the traditional standard of probable cause affords.
Another argument in favor of using the traditional probable
cause standard is that there is solid evidence that protection
against customs and revenue searches was a major impetus to the
drafting of the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court, when extending a warrant requirement to tax searches, noted that "one of
the primary evils intended to be eliminated by the Fourth Amendment was the massive intrusion on privacy undertaken in the collection of taxes pursuant to general warrants and writs of assistance." 90 Some historians ascribe at least partial responsibility for
the creation of the constitutional search and seizure protection to
the overreaching practices of colonial customs inspectors and revenue collectors. As one commentator notes, "[i]t was through efforts
to control abusive enforcement of tax laws that limits were first
placed on search and seizure."91

While this historical insight is not dispositive, the genesis of
the fourth amendment in the excesses of colonial revenue enforcement supports the application of the traditional probable cause
measure to tax seizure warrants. The framers' perception of tax
collectors' searches as acutely intrusive underscores the centrality
of IRS inspections to traditional fourth amendment concerns, and
points to the need for an independent magisterial review of tax
warrants.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that no set of IRS administrative guidelines could ever surmount the Camara reasonable[b]ecause of the aforementioned quote from Barlow's, negating the requirement of
probable cause in the criminal sense, and because the OSHA inspections involved in
these appeals are similar to those in Camara and See, the less stringent probable cause
test must be applied here.
Establishment Inspection, 589 F.2d at 1339. Burkart Randall Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 1313, 1317 (7th Cir. 1980), and Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., Inc., 647 F.2d 96,
102-03 (10th Cir. 1981), employ the same superficial reasoning.
10 G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 355.
9 Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 25 (1966). See also
Telford Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 26-27 (1969), citing L. Kinvin
Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds., 2 Legal Papers of John Adams 107 (1965):
Parliamentary enactments of 1660 and 1662 authorized the issuance of 'writs of assistance' by the Court of Exchequer, for the seizure of any 'prohibited or uncustomed'
goods, to effect which the constables could break and enter houses, shops, and any
'other Place.' It was under the authority of the 1662 statute that the writs of assistance
were issued which were the subject of the great case before the Superior Court of Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts Bay in 1761. In its course James Otis made the
famous argument denouncing these writs which, according to John Adams, 'breathed
into this nation the breath of life.'
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ness threshold. Yet, even were this not the case, the present § 6331
does not meet Camara's further requirement of "neutral" guidelines, as the statute does not ensure that the behavior of IRS
agents will be non-discretionary. The language of the provision imposes no limits on IRS seizures, but rather explicitly endorses
seizure "by any means." The Supreme Court has acknowledged
this absence of legislative oversight, stating that
[i]f more than one location is involved, the Secretary will
choose which dwelling will be invaded. If property is to be
found both in public places and in private areas, the Secretary
may choose which to92 seize. This hardly can be called a restraint on discretion.

It is, to say the least, ironic that after the explicit pronouncement
that the tax seizure statute is an inadequate buffer against governmental prerogative, any lower court would find that tax warrants
met Camara'srequirement of neutral guidelines.
V.

CONCLUSION

As they are broad in scope, often lengthy, involve the threat of
seizure, and hinge on IRS officials' discretion as to which sites to
search and which items to seize, searches under § 6331 of the Internal Revenue Code demand the rigorous review provided by the
traditional probable cause inquiry. Tax seizure warrants fail to
match the profile of searches calling for the administrative probable cause standard under the framework developed in Camara and
its progeny.
Although collection of revenue is concededly an important social goal, it is absurd to claim that tax collection is, in effect, necessarily a more pressing public aim than the effective enforcement of
criminal laws. At the same time, searches pursuant to § 6331 are
hostile and non-routine, and thus should be considered more intrusive than housing inspections or similar health and safety searches.
Finally, the seizure statute does not constrain the state's discretion
in implementing tax warrants through neutral guidelines.
Both historical evidence and pragmatic concerns argue in
favor of the use of the traditional probable cause standard in the
tax seizure context. The criminal search standard, under which the
individual exposed to a search pursuant to § 6331 benefits from the
full probable cause scrutiny that other discretionary, specific, and
91 G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 357.
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"hostile" intrusions are given, is compelled by the fourth amendment shield of privacy.

